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The Effect of Government Purchases 
on Economic Growth in Japan 
 
Abstract:  We  consider  whether  there  is  statistical  evidence  for  a  causal 
relationship between government expenditures and real GDP growth in postwar 
Japan. After studying the time-series properties of these variables, we find that 
government consumption and government investment both have a positive and 
causal effect on growth. This suggests that fiscal policy may not have been as 
ineffective during the last two decades of Japan’s stagnant growth as some have 
suggested, but may have helped to prevent an even more severe balance-sheet 





Other than China’s emergence as a major engine of economic growth, one of the most 
stunning turnarounds in modern economic history is the lost generation of Japanese growth. 
Japan  was  not  only  the  largest  economy  in  Asia,  it  was  also  a  model  for  other  regional 
economies. In trying to restore growth after the asset bubble collapse of 1989, Japan’s Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) used fiscal policy, especially through construction projects, to keep its 
hold on the popular vote. However, such government spending does not appear to have led to a 
fast-growing economy, at least not to the casual observer, even though central government debt 
has now risen to 170 percent of GDP.  
  A common methodological pitfall in the literature that tries to uncover the causal links 
between government spending and long-term economic growth is that they regularly conduct 
Granger  causality  tests  outside  the  cointegration  framework.
1  As  is  now  well-known,  this 
problem may render many of their conclusions invalid (Granger, 1988). Furthermore, the papers 
                                                 
1   Ghali (1998) and Islam (2001) are among the exceptions.  
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that do place their Granger causality analyses within the cointegration framework do not tend to 
implement a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model, which is the natural follow up in the case in 
which the variables are cointegrated, given that the definitive test of causality lies with the error 
correction term (Engle and Granger, 1987; Granger, 1988).
2  
In  this  paper,  we  examine  the  statistical  evidence  for  the  relationship  between 
government spending and GDP growth in Japan, using quarterly data from 1955 to 2009. Our 
findings  are  in  line  with  an  evolving  new  consensus  in  the  economics  profession  (see 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, & Rebelo, 2009) that the fiscal multiplier for government purchases is 
larger when interest rates are near the zero bound, and follow on similar work applied to the 
United States (Guerrero & Parker, 2007). Our empirical exercises show a positive but modest 
effect of government spending on real GDP in Japan. Thus, expansionary fiscal policy may 
have played the role of avoiding a deeper economic depression than the one observed during 
Japan’s lost decades.  
 
2. Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth in Japan 
From  the  early  days  of  the  Meiji  restoration,  Japan  had  a  strong  interventionist 
government,  but  the  relationship  between  government  and  big  business  was  much  more 
collaborative than adversarial. Japanese postwar government policy helped transform the huge 
Zaibatsus  into  bank-centered  Keiretsu  firms,  with  an  “iron  triangle”  of  firm  leaders,  LDP 
politicians, and government technocrats setting most government trade, banking and finance 
                                                 
2   The only exception we could find is Ghali (1998), who implements VEC models in a setup with multiple 
cross-sections (ten advanced countries), but short time spans (quarterly data for the period 1970-94). Islam (2001) 
implements Johansen-Juselius’ weak exogeneity tests, but reports no VEC model.  
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policies. From 1955 to 1973, Japan’s real per-capita GDP quadrupled, with an average annual 
growth rate of 8.4 percent that was largely driven by a high savings rate and a successful export 
orientation.  The  nominal  size  of  government  remained  relatively  small  for  a  developed 
economy, in part because Japan had to keep its military expenditures low, and because most 
pensions were managed through the big firms and private savings, not through government 
transfers. 
After the worldwide recession in the mid-1970s hit Japan harder due to its exclusive 
dependence on imported oil, Japan was never able to achieve its prior rapid growth rates, but 
nonetheless Japanese growth rates were still impressive. From 1973 through the peak of the 
bubble economy in 1990, Japanese real per-capita growth averaged 3.8 percent per year, and its 
trade surplus helped it build large reserves of foreign assets in spite of an appreciating currency. 
These growth rates are shown in Figure 1. 
When the bubble burst, however, severe problems began.  According to Chakraborty 
(2009), the slowdown resulted from increased inefficiency in both labor and capital allocation. 
Nadenichek  (2007)  argues  that  pessimistic  consumer  expectations  was  a  key  factor  in  the 
continued  slow  growth,  while  Horioka  (2006)  found  that  stagnant  private  fixed  investment 
reduced household disposable income and overall wealth, increasing consumer uncertainty. 
Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) argue that lax regulation created an incentive for 
banks to continue lending to “zombie” firms, keeping them alive when they should have shed 
their claim on the economy’s capital and labor resources, and these banks in turn were propped 
up by the government. In what Koo (2003) called a balance sheet recession, both banks and  
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firms in the real sector became averse to debt, while savings were redirected toward liquid 
assets with less risk.  
For several  years  following the burst of the bubble, the newly-independent Bank of 
Japan refused to relent on a tight money policy which had helped to pop the bubble, in part 
because it hoped to force the Finance Ministry to reform the financial system; once it did relent, 
it did so half-heartedly, with a zero-interest rate policy that did not account for the effect of 
deflation on the real interest rate. Cargill and Parker (2004) demonstrated how deflation reduced 
Japanese  consumption  while  increasing  money  demand  faster  than  the  Bank  of  Japan  was 
willing to increase the supply.  
If  monetary  policy  was  ineffectively  used,  then  what  about  fiscal  policy?  When  the 
bubble burst, Japanese government purchases totaled about 20 percent of GDP, significantly 
less than most other OECD countries. As Figure 1 shows, this ratio rose to 24 percent by 1999, 
and then fell back to 22 percent before the recession of 2007-2009. In the first five years, the 
growth  was  primarily  in  public  investment.  By  2007  this  investment  share  had  declined  to 
postwar lows, while public consumption rose from 13 percent of GDP in 1990 to 18 percent in 
2007.  
Cargill and Sakamoto (2008) argue that the LDP had traditionally used Keynesian fiscal 
policy  to  respond  to  prior  recessions,  and  that  this  approach  was  again  used  after  1990, 
particularly  with  the  Fiscal  Investment  and  Loan  Program  (FILP),  as  an  alternative  to  real 
reforms that might have addressed underlying problems in firm behavior. As the stagnation of 
the Japanese economy continued, the government became less and less fiscally conservative, at  
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least until the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, when there was an effort to increase taxes and 
tighten spending. 
Was  fiscal  policy  ineffective?  Perri  (2001)  used  a  general  equilibrium  simulation  to 
argue that the expansionary effects of fiscal policy in Japan were mostly canceled out by the 
crowding-out effects. However, Kuttner and Posen (2001) examined the hypothesis that fiscal 
policy  was  ineffective  in  Japan  in  the  decade  after  the  bubble  collapsed,  using  a  vector 
autoregression approach. What they concluded was that fiscal policy was actually effective, as 
savers appeared to passively accommodate it, but inadequate. Rising debt levels were not so 
much  caused  by  increases  in  expenditures,  but  rather  by  falling  revenues  to  the  continued 
slowdown. Leightner and Inoue (2009) found that the effects of fiscal policy in Japan were 
asymmetric, in that the multiplier for reductions in spending were larger than for increases. 
Ono  (2008)  used  a  Granger-causality  framework  to  examine  the  link  between 
government expenditures and government revenue, and found that the variables were linked 
prior to the 1990s, while they became independent afterwards. As the economy slowed, there 
was much less emphasis on constraining debt, and expenditures were no longer bound by the 
taxes  collected.  As  Tamada  (2009)  demonstrated,  government  spending  in  Japan  had  a 
significant effect on voting patterns. This would suggest that government investment purchases 
was less likely to have as significant of an economic return. But the ratio of these government 
investments  declined  over  the  past  decade,  while  overall  government  purchases  remained 
relatively steady, at least until the Great Recession of 2008-2009 led to a 7 percent decline in 
Japan’s per-capita GDP.  
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3. The Effect of Government Spending on Growth 
How should government spending in Japan have affected its growth? Poot (2000) argued 
that there are at least seven separate effects of government spending on growth. These include, 
among other factors, the provision of pure and quasi public goods, the distortionary effect of 
taxes  on  resource  allocation,  and  the  comparative  inefficiency  of  government  control  over 
resources and production. The public choice literature focuses on the theoretical reasons for 
inefficient provision of goods and services by the state, for reasons of inappropriate incentives, 
insufficient information, and inadequate competition. The private sector, however, has its own 
share of inefficiencies, and government spending may help to offset the effects of these market 
failures. 
In  addition  to  the  microeconomic  affects,  government  expenditures  may  have  a  real 
fiscal  effect  on  aggregate  demand  in  an  economy  with  excess  capacity,  especially  when 
monetary policy is limited by deflation, fiscal crises, and the zero lower bound on interest rates. 
On the other hand, increased government spending near full employment may crowd out the 
private  sector,  especially  when  exchange  rates  float  and  monetary  policy  does  not  have  to 
accommodate fiscal expansion. 
Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Rebelo  (2009)  have  argued  that  the  fiscal  effects  of 
government spending can be large when interest rates are near the zero bound, as monetary 
policy no longer follows a Taylor rule response. This argument is also consistent with that of 
Leijonhufvud (2009) who, citing Minsky (1977), examined the leveraging and deleveraging 
phases of the financial cycle to support the argument that private finance was the source of the 
worldwide Great Recession.  
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Minsky  (1986,  ch.  2)  explains  why  recessions  accompanied  by  financial  crises  are 
especially severe, and why fiscal policy becomes particularly important in stabilizing balance 
sheets by augmenting low-quality assets with government bonds, by creating deficits in the 
public sector to offset sudden, undesired surpluses in the private sector. An interventionist fiscal 
policy may thus not create positive growth as much as it prevents a more significant recession. 
Barro (1990) posited that the aggregate relationship between the size of government and 
economic growth may be shaped like an inverted-U, with low growth resulting from both too 
little and too much government, and the effect of government spending depends on the type of 
spending. Defense spending, or investment in public infrastructure and education, may have 
significantly different effects than transfers and public consumption.  
On the empirical front, Landau (1983, 1986) found a negative effect of government 
consumption on growth, while Ram (1986) found a positive effect. The international evidence 
uncovered over the last two decades since these studies has remained decidedly mixed. In his 
survey,  Slemrod  (1995)  argues  that  the  aggregate  effect  of  government  involvement  is 
negligible, though some types of taxes affect some behaviors significantly. Engen and Skinner 
(1996) focus on the effect of taxes, and they find mildly negative effects for some taxes and 
positive  effects  for  others,  but  like  much  of  the  rest  of  the  literature,  the  effects  of  larger 
government are contradictory, ambiguous, and in the aggregate rather minimal.  
Poot (2000) cited 41 studies in his survey, with seven finding a positive effect, twelve 
finding a negative effect, and 23 inconclusive. Even more recently, Lee and Lin (2007) found a 
negative effect of government that became insignificant once demographic factors were taken 
into account. Plümper and Martin (2003) found a negative effect of government on growth  
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primarily in non-democratic countries, a result generally consistent with the findings of Guseh 
(1997) and Scully (2001), which suggests that governments in democratic societies are more 
likely to spend money  on public investments,  and less likely to divert public resources for 
personal purposes.  
 
4. The Time-Series Properties of Japanese Government Purchases and Growth 
We start by defining Y as Japan’s real GDP, G as the real value of central and local 
government purchases, Gc as the real value of government consumption, and Gi as the real 
value of government investment (where G ≠ Gc + Gi precisely, due to discrepancies). The first 
differences in these variables are defined as dY, dG, dGc, and dGi, and the growth rates are 
defined as y, g, gc, and gi. These seasonally-adjusted, quarterly data were collected from the 
Statistics Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The sample 
spans the period 1955:1-2009:3.  
Figure 1.1 shows the time profile of the variables Y, G, Gc, and Gi in their levels, and it 
is not obvious from this graph whether these variables can be regarded as trend stationary. 
Similarly, Figure 1.2 displays the rates of growth y and g, and it is also not clear if these rates of 
growth are either trend-stationary or difference-stationary.  
As is well-known, running regressions involving I(1) variables may give rise to spurious 
results and multiple inference and interpretations problems, given that the F-statistic does not 
follow the tabulated values of Fisher’s F distribution (Granger & Newbold, 1974). Furthermore, 
as Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) make clear, the issue is not whether the data are integrated  
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per se, but rather whether the estimated coefficients or t-statistics of interest have a non-standard 
distribution in the case when the regressors are in fact integrated. 
Table 1 contains the results for a battery of unit root tests including the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  test,  the  Kwiatkowski,  Phillips,  Schmidt,  and  Shin  (KPSS)  test,  and  the 
Elliott,  Rothenberg,  and  Stock  (ERS)  test.  The  ADF  test  was  specified  to  use  a  maximum 
number of lags equal to 14 and the optimal number of lags was decided for each test using the 
Schwartz Information Criterion. The KPSS test uses a spectral estimation method (in this case, 
the Bartlett kernel) and the optimal number of lags used was chosen case-by-case using the 
Newey-West bandwith, and the results were similar when we fixed the number of lags at 4 for 
all tests. The ERS test also uses a spectral estimation procedure (AR spectral OLS, in this case), 
the maximum number of lags allowed in the regressions was set equal to 14, and the optimal 
number of lags was chosen in each test using the Schwartz Information Criterion.  
Both the ADF and KPSS tests provide clear evidence that Y contains a unit root in its 
level (i.e., it is an I(1) process), but apparently not in its first-difference (i.e., Y is first-difference 
stationary).
3 The ERS tests show the opposite result, suggesting that Y is trend-stationary in its 
level, but displays a unit root in its first difference (we found some evidence that this last result 
may be driven by a structural break in the year 1973, but the evidence is not conclusive). Using 
tests that allowed for structural breaks in the real GDP series level, Cheung and Chinn (1986) 
also rejected the unit root hypothesis (at the 10 percent significance level and using a different 
dataset) for the level of Japan’s real GDP, and were among the first to show that Japan’s real 
GDP can equally plausibly be thought of as trend-stationary.  
                                                 
3   For a more detailed discussion on different procedures to test for unit roots in the real GDP series the 
reader is referred to Cheung and Chinn (1986).  
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Similar conclusions arise in regards to the government expenditure variables. The ADF 
and KPSS tests both reject the hypothesis of trend-stationarity in the variables’ levels, while not 
rejecting the hypothesis of first difference-stationarity. The ERS tests arrive at the opposite 
conclusion, namely the ERS tests find the government expenditure variables’ levels to be trend-
stationary whereas the first differences display unit roots.  
Table 2 provides a summary of the variables’ stationarity and unit roots, and illustrates 
two major points. First, a common specification in the literature is to regress real GDP growth 
on the share of government purchases G/Y, and these shares are shown in Figure 2. But in this 
case,  these  variables  are  not  integrated  of  the  same  order  as  y,  the  growth  rate  of  GDP. 
Regressing a stationary dependent variable on independent variables which are not stationary is 
an approach that Granger (1986: 216) argues “makes no sense as the independent and dependent 
variables have such vastly different temporal properties.” Indeed, the expected coefficient(s) 
from such a regression would be zero in such a case. Thus, we should not run regressions 
combining these variables.  
Second, real GDP and real government spending variables are not stationary in their 
levels (i.e., not trend-stationary), according to both the ADF and the KPSS tests, but they are 
stationary in their first differences. However, the opposite is true according to the ERS test, that 
real GDP and real government spending are trend-stationary but their first differences display 
unit roots (i.e., first differences are not stationary). This difficulty is not new; see, for example, 
the pioneering work of Cheung and Chinn (1986) for the comparison of results between the 
ADF and KPSS tests. Disentangling this ambiguity in tests results exceeds the scope of this  
  11
paper. Instead, we follow a pragmatic strategy in order to focus on the main goal of this paper, 
which is to study the effectiveness of government spending to affect real GDP.  
We thus take an agnostic approach regarding unit roots and proceed in two steps. First, 
we run unrestricted VAR models in the variables’ levels. Second, we run the unrestricted VAR 
models  in  the  variables’  first  differences.  Finally,  we  conduct  a  cointegration  analysis  and 
estimate a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model to extract causality implications from it.  
 
5. An Unrestricted VAR Approach 
As a first approach to analyzing the effect of the levels of G on Y, and of the growth 
rates g on y, we estimated unrestricted Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) models from which we 
extracted impulse-response results. An advantage of using an unrestricted VAR model is that it 
implies  a  non-committal  approach  to  the  data  in  which  issues  of  causation,  timing,  and 
appropriate structural restrictions are temporarily left on hold, awaiting further analysis.  
Since  the  impulse-response  results  are  sensitive  to  the  Cholesky-ordering  of  the 
variables in the VAR, we first conduct Granger block-exogeneity tests on the variables’ levels 
and first differences to gain some intuition on the most appropriate order of the variables. As 
shown in Table 3 for 8, 9, and 10 lags, all the tests strongly suggest ordering the purchases 
variables first and real GDP second.
4  
 
                                                 
4 Eight, nine and ten lags are used in the Granger tests of Table 3, since using four lags created a significant number 
of inconclusive tests in the case of the variables in their rates of growth.   
  12
Unrestricted VAR models in the variables’ levels: 
For the real levels of the variables, we follow the Final Prediction Error, the Akaike 
Information Criterion, and the Hanna-Quinn Information Criterion, all of which suggest the use 
of 4 lags as the optimal lag structure. Other, longer lag structures were also tried (again, 8 and 9 
lags) and results were still generally in line with the ones reported.  
  In the first rows of Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, we show the impulse-response diagrams 
from the VAR(4) model. For the levels of G, Gc, and Gi, government purchases, consumption, 
and investment all have a significant effect on the level of GDP, while GDP does not appear to 
increase government purchases, contrary to what we would expect from Wagner (1893).  
On average, a one standard-deviation increase in real government spending leads, over a 
period of two and a half years, to an approximately 40 point increase in real GDP, relative to an 
index where 1955:1 GDP = 100. This is equivalent to an increase of 3.3 percent in Japan’s real 
GDP of Japan at the end of the sample (2009:3). Interestingly, the smallest effect (10 points 
accumulated over a period of 10 quarters) occurs for government consumption. Fiscal policy 
shows some of its strongest effects in the form of government investment. This evidence is in 
line with Koo (2008), who presented complementary evidence on the effectiveness of Japan’s 
fiscal policy.  
 
Unrestricted VAR models in the variables’ growth rates: 
In considering the growth rates y, g, gc, and gi, we find that four of the five information criteria 
used to determine the optimal lag structure still suggest the use of four lags, and we follow this  
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again. Granger tests of block exogeneity, shown in the bottom of Table 3, suggest ordering the 
variables with g entering first, and y second.  
The impulse-response diagrams are displayed in the bottom panels of Figures 3.1, 3.2, 
and 3.3. A one standard deviation to the growth of real government purchases has a strongly 
positive compounded effect on the growth of real GDP, adding one and a half percentage points 
over a 10-quarter period. A similar shock to the rate of growth of real government consumption 
increases real GDP growth by one full percentage point over a 10 quarter period, while a one-
standard-deviation shock to government investment has a slightly larger effect. These results 
again support the argument that government purchases have had a positive effect on real GDP 
in Japan during the postwar period. 
The unrestricted VAR approach is not free of problems, however. Problems with this 
approach include the potential for inefficient estimation due to over-parameterization (Zellner, 
1988),  and  misspecification  when  the  data  are  first-differenced  and  the  variables  are 
cointegrated (Engle & Granger, 1987), as is potentially the case here. Hence, more analysis is 
needed.  
 
6. Cointegration Analysis 
If  the  variables  Y  and  G  are  cointegrated,  causality  tests  conducted  outside  the 
cointegration  analysis  framework  may  lead  to  incorrect  causal  inferences,  since  the  error 
correction term is omitted in the specifications used to test for Granger causality (see Granger, 
1988, for additional discussion). Hence, to account for that difficulty we follow a two step 
procedure in what follows. First, we check if the variables for GDP and government purchases  
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are cointegrated. Second, if the hypothesis that the series are not cointegrated is rejected, we 
implement a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model in order to double check the results on block 
exogeneity  reported  in  Table  3.  If  cointegration  test  results  show  the presence  of  only  one 
cointegrating equation, the one in which G is the dependent variable and Y the explanatory one, 
and  the  VEC  model  contains  only  one  statistically  significant  error  correction  term  in  the 
dynamic equations then, and only then, the block exogeneity test results reported below in Table 
3 are valid (Granger, 1988). 
 In general, if two variables such as G and Y are both I(1), any combination of these 
variables, such as Z = G – aY, will also be I(1), where Z is called the equilibrium error term. 
However, there may exist a singularity a*, such that G - a*Y is I(0). If such a singularity exists, 
G and Y are said to be cointegrated. This implies that in the long-run, although G and Y can be 
arbitrarily high or low, they must be proportional to each other, with a factor of proportionality 
a*. It is clearly possible for more than one equilibrium relation to govern the joint behavior of 
the variables. 
Johansen’s cointegration tests statistics are shown in Tables 4.1, with the results for the 
variables in levels, and in Table 4.2, with the results for variables in growth rates. In general, the 
variables in the levels contain only one cointegrating relation, with the exception being the case 
of the pair of (Gi, Y), for which there tends to be a lack of cointegration (except for the case in 
which the data are allowed no trend and the test includes only an intercept, but no trend). In the 
growth rates, there tends to be two cointegrating relations (i.e., bi-directional causation) for the 
growth  variables  in  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  cases  considered  in  the  different  
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cointegration tests. The prevalence of a single cointegrating relationship in the case of the levels 
raises the question of the direction of causation, which is addressed in the next section. 
 
7. The Vector Error Correction Models  
Engle and Granger (1987) have shown that if two variables are cointegrated, then there 
must exist a VEC model linking these variables. Furthermore, the VEC model representation of 
the bivariate system of cointegrated variables sheds light on the direction of causation between 
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where L is the lag operator, T is the number of lags to be included, and the error correction 
terms are given by  1 ) ( - t j E for j = 1, 2, which are the residuals from the OLS static regressions 
of G on Y and vice versa, respectively. In equations (1) and (2), the VEC model allows for the 
finding that G Granger-causes Y, or vice versa, so long as the corresponding error correction 
term carries a statistically significant coefficient, even if the estimated dj coefficients are not 
jointly  statistically  significant  (Granger,  1988).  If  G  and  Y  are  cointegrated,  then  the  error  
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correction  terms  are  stationary  I(0)  processes.  Conversely,  if  the  residuals  from  the  static 
regressions involving G and Y are I(0), then G and Y are cointegrated (Engle & Granger, 1987). 
The estimates of the VEC model contain important information regarding the long-run 
relationship and the short-run dynamics involved in the relationship between G and Y. We chose 
Johansen’s  (1992)  estimation  procedure,
5  and  Table  5  displays  the  estimates.  The  error 
correction terms leave no room for doubt: causation runs unidirectionally from real GDP to 
government purchasing  variables, and not the reverse. The impulse-response diagrams from 
these VEC models clearly show that an increase in real government purchases still produces 
positive effects on real GDP, as shown in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. 
  One way to reconcile the causality results from the error correction terms of Table 5 
with  the  ones  displayed  in  the  impulse-response  diagrams  in  Figure  4  is  by  means  of  the 
hypothesis that Japanese government officials have tended to react immediately to increases in 
real  GDP  by  contracting  government  spending,  as  displayed  in  the  right-hand  charts.  This 
introduces  a  systematic  pattern  of  causation  from  real  GDP  to  government  spending,  as 
suggested by the error correction terms of Table 5 because a positive innovation to real GDP is 
immediately followed by a reduction in government spending. Indeed, Koo (2008) has used a 
similar explanation to account for the premature fiscal consolidations of 1997 and 2001 that 
aborted strong economic recoveries that had been fueled by an activist fiscal policy in a context 
of a zero lower bound constraint for short-term interest rates.  
                                                 





Our study examines whether government purchases in Japan helped or hurt GDP. This is 
a very important issue for Japan after two lost decades of growth, in which Japan has failed to 
return to a consistent growth path while debt has grown substantially. 
Our dataset included quarterly data on GDP, government consumption, and government 
investment from 1955 to 2009. This dataset permits a careful study of the time-series properties 
of  these  variables  for  stationarity,  cointegration,  and  Granger  causality.  Our  results  support 
other  evidence  that  government  purchases  had  positive  effects  on  growth.  Government 
investment was not that much more effective than consumption, which suggests that the fiscal 
impact was at least as important as the effect of public infrastructure on potential GDP.  
These results are consistent with the argument that fiscal policy may have worked in 
Japan,  but  its  observed  effects,  though  consistently  positive,  were  generally  modest.  The 
financial crisis in Japan was severe, and the balance sheet troubles it created were long-lasting. 
It  was  accompanied by  a monetary  policy that  was tighter than it should have been in the 
context, with deflation an unpleasant result. Expansionary fiscal policy may only have helped 
ease the downturn. But that, as remarked by Koo (2008) and Leijonhufvud (2009), for example, 
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 Table 1: ADF, KPSS, and ERS Test Statistics 
    Y  G  Gc  Gi 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests         
 Null Hypothesis: Level is not stationary  -0.725  -1.425  -3.173  -0.168 
 Null Hypothesis: Difference is not stationary  -5.514  -17.762  -21.708  -15.036 
Test critical values:  1% level  -4.001       
  5% level  -3.431       
  10% level  -3.139       
           
KPSS* Unit Root Tests (LM Statistics)         
 Null Hypothesis: Level is stationary  1.914  1.91  1.516  1.453 
 Null Hypothesis: Difference is stationary  0.318  0.167  0.588  0.581 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1% level  0.739       
  5% level  0.463       
  10% level  0.347       
           
Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock Test Statistics         
 Null Hypothesis: Level is not stationary  14.765  26.275  184.339  44.314 
 Null Hypothesis: Difference is not stationary  2.899  0.917  1.146  0.843 
Test critical values:  1% level  4.041       
  5% level  5.656       
  10% level  6.863       




Table 2: Summary of Stationarity Results 
Stationarity Results at 5% level 
  ADF  KPSS  ERS 
 Y  NS  NS  S 
 G  NS  NS (1)  S 
 Gc  NS (1)  NS  S 
 Gi  NS  NS  S 
       
 G/Y  NS  NS (1)  S 
 Gc/Y  NS  NS  S 
 Gi/Y  NS  NS  S 
       
  y  S  S  NS 
  g  S  NS (1)  NS 
  gc  S  S  NS 
  gi  S  S  NS 
S = Stationary at 5%     
NS = Non-Stationary     

















Table 3: Block Exogeneity and Granger tests 
Variables in Levels 
Null Hypothesis: 
Lags of Y are not  
block-exogenous 
Lags of G are not  
block-exogenous 
Variable    Obs  F-stat  p-value    F-stat  p-value 
G  8 lags  211  4.16  0.000    0.68  0.710 
  9 lags  210  3.98  0.000    0.73  0.685 
  10 lags  209  3.87  0.000    0.74  0.684 
               
Gc  8 lags  211  2.16  0.032    1.34  0.227 
  9 lags  210  2.03  0.039    1.71  0.089 
  10 lags  209  1.75  0.072    2.25  0.017 
               
Gi  8 lags  211  1.57  0.136    1.29  0.248 
  9 lags  210  2.04  0.037    1.49  0.154 
  10 lags  209  2.23  0.018    1.38  0.193 
               
Variables in Growth rates 
Null Hypothesis: 
Lags of y are not  
block-exogenous 
Lags of g are not  
block-exogenous 
    Obs  F-stat  p-value    F-stat  p-value 
g  8 lags  210  4.99  0.000    1.20  0.296 
  9 lags  209  5.40  0.000    1.11  0.355 
  10 lags  208  1.47  0.115    1.11  0.354 
               
gc   8 lags  210  4.48  0.000    2.02  0.046 
  9 lags  209  5.07  0.000    1.73  0.084 
  10 lags  208  4.13  0.000    1.47  0.155 
               
gi   8 lags  210  2.81  0.006    1.77  0.085 
  9 lags  209  2.92  0.003    1.71  0.090 
  10 lags  208  2.56  0.006    1.70  0.083 
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Table 4.1: Bilateral Johansen’s Cointegration Tests for Variables in Levels 
Lags interval: 1 to 4 
Selected (0.05 level*)  
 
Series: G and Y          
   Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model 
Data 
Trend:  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 
Test Type 
No 
Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept 




Trend  Trend  Trend 
Trace  1  1  1  0  1 
Max-Eig  1  1  1  1  1 
Series: Gc and Y         
  Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model 
Data 
Trend:  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 
Test Type 
No 
Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept 




Trend  Trend  Trend 
Trace  1  1  2  1  1 
Max-Eig  1  1  2  1  1 
Series: Gi and Y         
  Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model 
Data 
Trend:  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 
Test Type 
No 
Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept 




Trend  Trend  Trend 
Trace  0  1  0  0  0 
Max-Eig  0  1  0  0  0 
 *Critical values based on MacKinnon, Haug, & Michelis (1999).   
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Table 4.2: Bilateral Johansen’s Cointegration Tests for Variables in Growth Rates 
Lags interval: 1 to 4 
 Selected (0.05 level*)  
 
Series: g and y  
  Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model 
Data Trend:  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 
Test Type  No Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept 




Trend  Trend  Trend 
Trace  2  2  2  2  2 
Max-Eig  2  2  2  2  2 
Series: gc and y  
  Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model 
Data Trend:  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 
Test Type  No Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept 




Trend  Trend  Trend 
Trace  1  1  2  2  2 
Max-Eig  1  1  2  2  2 
Series: gi and y  
  Number of Cointegrating Relations by Model 
Data Trend:  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 
Test Type  No Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept  Intercept 




Trend  Trend  Trend 
Trace  2  2  2  2  2 
Max-Eig  2  2  2  2  2 















Table 5: VEC between Measures of Government and GDP in Levels 
 
  Gov't Purchases  Gov't Consumption  Gov't Investment 
 
Cointegrating Equation:               
G(-1)  1      1      1   
Y(-1)  -1.045      -1.560      -3.021   
  -0.025      -0.093      -0.966   
  [-41.00]      [-16.75]      [-3.13]   
Constant  25.753      406.861      1399.554   
                 
Error Correction Model:               
  dG  dY    dGc  dY    dGi  dY 
CointEq1  -0.097  -0.009    -0.022  0.000    0.006  0.001 
  -0.021  -0.013    -0.005  -0.004    -0.003  -0.001 
  [-4.51]  [-0.71]    [-4.73]  [-0.07]    [ 2.14]  [ 1.36] 
dG(-1)  -0.195  -0.050    -0.449  -0.097    0.022  -0.035 
  -0.070  -0.042    -0.070  -0.057    -0.071  -0.016 
  [-2.78]  [-1.20]    [-6.38]  [-1.71]    [ 0.31]  [-2.20] 
dY(-1)  0.044  0.198    -0.180  0.026    0.028  0.174 
  -0.124  -0.074    -0.075  -0.060    -0.314  -0.072 
  [ 0.35]  [ 2.69]    [-2.40]  [ 0.43]    [ 0.09]  [ 2.44] 
dY(-2)  -0.066  0.126    -0.122  0.029    -0.088  0.143 
  -0.122  -0.072    -0.076  -0.061    -0.308  -0.070 
  [-0.54]  [ 1.73]    [-1.61]  [ 0.48]    [-0.29]  [ 2.04] 
dY(-3)  -0.487  0.199    0.046  0.217    -0.530  0.215 
  -0.130  -0.077    -0.089  -0.071    -0.321  -0.073 
  [-3.76]  [ 2.58]    [ 0.52]  [ 3.04]    [-1.65]  [ 2.95] 
dY(-4)  -0.164  -0.165    -0.207  0.222    0.229  -0.137 
  -0.145  -0.086    -0.093  -0.075    -0.349  -0.080 
  [-1.13]  [-1.92]    [-2.23]  [ 2.98]    [ 0.66]  [-1.73] 
Constant  9.725  3.330    12.264  3.643    5.146  3.063 
  -1.562  -0.929    -1.616  -1.298    -3.428  -0.780 
  [ 6.23]  [ 3.58]    [ 7.59]  [ 2.81]    [ 1.50]  [ 3.93] 
  
R-squared  0.159  0.135    0.259  0.142    0.043  0.155 
 Adj. R-squared  0.121  0.097    0.226  0.105    0.001  0.118 
 F-statistic  4.273  3.550    7.909  3.766    1.031  4.165 
 Akaike AIC  8.117  7.077    7.507  7.069    10.014  7.054 
 Schwarz SC  8.274  7.234    7.665  7.226    10.171  7.211 
 Included observations: 214 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in (parentheses) and t-statistics in [brackets] 
Note: Insignificant lags are not shown  
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Figure 3.1: Accumulated Response for Government Purchases 
Cholesky One-Standard Deviations +/- Two Standard Errors 
 
(A)  Accumulated Response of Y to G   Accumulated Response of G to Y 
   




Figure 3.2: Accumulated Response for Government Consumption 
Cholesky One-Standard Deviation Shocks +/- Two Standard Errors 
  
(A)  Accumulated Response of Y to Gc   Accumulated Response of Gc to Y 
 
(B)  Accumulated Response of dY to dGc      Accumulated Response of dGc to dY  
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Figure 3.3: Accumulated Response for Government Investment 
Cholesky One-Standard Deviations +/- Two Standard Errors 
  
(A)  Accumulated Response of Y to Gi   Accumulated Response of Gi to Y 
 
 







 Figure 4: Accumulated Response for Government Purchases 
 
  Accumulated Response of Y to G   Accumulated Response of G to Y 
 
 
  Accumulated Response of Y to Gc   Accumulated Response of Gc to Y 
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